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Abstract 
This essay discusses several aspects of the legal procedures relating to Aeschines’ 
prosecution of Ctesiphon in 330 BCE. First, the essay demonstrates that through an 
improved reading of the law at Demosthenes 23.92 that Ctesiphon’s proposal had not 
expired when Aeschines brought his case to court in 330. Second, the essay shows that 
the penalty Aeschines would have suffered for not gaining one fifth of the votes at the 
trial was not the loss of the right to bring the same kind of cases again but the loss of the 
right to bring any public cases in the future. Third, the essays analyzes the phrase ‘trials 
brought by decree’ (Aeschin. 3.4) and proves that the phrase refers to trials in the 
Assembly brought on the basis of an ad hoc decree and not to trials in the courts with 
procedures modified by a decree of the Assembly. 
 
In questo saggio vengono discussi alcuni aspetti della procedura relativa all’azione 
intentata da Eschine contro Ctesifonte nel 330 a.C. Prima di tutto si intende dimostrare, 
attraverso una corretta interpretazione della legge riportata in Dem. 23.92, che la proposta 
di Ctesifonte non era scaduta quando Eschine agì in giudizio nel 330. In secondo luogo si 
vuole dimostrare che la penalità in cui Eschine rischiava di incorrere, qualora non avesse 
ottenuto un quinto dei voti dei giudici, era la perdita del diritto di intentare in futuro non 
soltanto lo stesso tipo di azioni ma ogni tipo di azione pubblica. In terzo luogo viene 
analizzata la locuzione ‘azioni intentate sulla base di un decreto’ (Aeschin. 3.4) allo scopo 
di dimostrare che essa si riferisce a processi della cui decisione viene investita l’Assemblea 
sulla base di un apposito decreto, non a processi di competenza dei tribunali seguendo 
procedure modificate in forza di un decreto dell’Assemblea. 
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 During the month of Thargelion, 338/7 BCE, Demosthenes proposed that the tribes 
meet on the second and third day of Skirophorion and that each tribe elect a teichopoios, a 
commissioner for the repair of the walls (Aeschin. 3.27). At these elections, Demosthenes 
was elected commissioner from his tribe Pandionis for the year 337/6 (Aeschin. 3.24. Cf. 
Dem. 18.119). As commissioner, Demosthenes received ten talents for the work on the 
walls (Aeschin. 3.23. Cf. 31). From his own resources, Demosthenes contributed one 
hundred mnai (Aeschin. 3.17. Cf. [Plut.] X orat. 845f). At the same time Demosthenes was 
also commissioner of the Theoric Fund (Aeschin. 3.24). Before Demosthenes submitted 
his accounts for these offices, Ctesiphon proposed to honor Demosthenes with a gold crown 
and to have his honors announced in the theater of Dionysus (Aeschin. 3.24). As Aeschines 
(3.219) states, this motion was made during the lifetime of Philip.1 Ctesiphon stated that 
Demosthenes deserved these honors not only for his contribution of ten mnai for the work 
on the walls, but also for ‘constantly speaking and doing what is best for the Athenian 
people’ (Aeschin. 3.237. Cf. 3.49). Before the proposal was put to the vote in the Assembly, 
Aeschines charged that the proposal was illegal and prevented it from being submitted to a 
vote by bringing a hypomosia (cf. Xen. Hell. 1.7.34; Dem. 18.103). This is clear from the 
fact that Demosthenes several times calls Ctesiphon’s proposal a probouleuma, which 
implies that it had not been ratified by the Assembly (Dem. 18.9 [προβουλεύματος], 53 
[προβεβουλευμένων], 118 [προβουλεύματος]). In another passage, Aeschines (Aeschin. 
3.213) says that Ctesiphon is the author of the ‘opinion’ submitted to the Assembly, not the 
decree enacted by the Assembly (γράψαντος τὴν γνώμην).  
 Even though Aeschines brought his charge against the proposal of Ctesiphon during 
the year 336, the case did not come to trial until six years later in the middle of 330.2 Several 
remarks by Aeschines in his speech against Ctesiphon confirm this date for the trial.3 First, 
Aeschines (3.162) mentions an Athenian embassy to Alexander, which can be dated to this 
 
1  For discussion of other dates in the sources see Wankel 1976: 11, note 14.  
2  Dion. Hal. Letter to Ammaeus 1.12.  
3  For the date of the speech see Wankel 1976: 31-33. 
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time.4 Second, Aeschines (3.132) mentions that the Persian king was no longer fighting for 
his kingdom but to save his life, which clearly alludes to his circumstances after his defeat 
at the battle of Gaugamela in the summer of 331.5 Third, Aeschines (2.252) alludes to the 
trial of Leocrates, which took place in 331.6 Fourth, Aeschines (3.165-7) mentions the 
revolt of Agis III of Sparta, but Aeschines (3.131) clearly implies that the revolt was over 
because the Spartans had sent hostages to Alexander.7 Fifth, Aeschines (3.254) states that 
the Pythia at Delphi will take place in a few days (ἡμερῶν μὲν ὀλίγων). This clearly alludes 
to the Pythia of 330, which took place during the summer.8  
In his speech at the trial, Aeschines (3.153-156) predicts that if the court votes to 
acquit Ctesiphon, the terms of his decree will be carried out, in particular the announcement 
of Demosthenes’ honors in the theater (τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἀνάρρησιν). Later in the 
speech, Aeschines (3.253-4. Cf. 259) states that by acquitting Ctesiphon they will have the 
honors of Demosthenes announced in the theater and that their verdict will give him a 
crown. Demosthenes (18.85. Cf. 266) also believes that if the vote goes in his favor, he will 
receive a crown.  
 In the nineteenth century Arnold Schaefer claimed that Ctesiphon’s proposal would 
no longer have been valid after a year (‘Zudem trat, als das Jahr abgelaufen war, der auf 
Ktesiphons Antrag gefaßte Ratsbeschluß außer Kraft’) and cited a law in Demosthenes’ 
speech Against Aristocrates (23.92), which appears to state that probouleumata expired 
after a year.9 Schaefer accordingly believed that the proposal must have been revived (‘der 
Ratsbeschluß erneuert ward’) on the grounds that Aeschines in his speech takes it for 
granted that if Ctesiphon is acquitted, the crowning of Demosthenes would take place at 
the next Dionysia (‘Aeschines in seiner ganzen Rede es als selbstverstanden annimmt, daß, 
wenn Ktesiphon freigesprochen werde, an den nächsten Dionysien die Bekränzung des 
Demosthenes stattfinde’). Goodwin also noticed that ‘The προβούλευμα of the Senate 
concerning the crown had legally expired at the end of the year 337-336. This was probably 
 
4  See Arr. An. 3.6.2; Curt. 4.8.1 with Wankel 1976, following the analysis of Schaefer 1887, 224, note  
1.  
5  For the date of Gaugamela see Bosworth 1988: 79-85. 
6  For the date of the trial of Leocrates see Harris 2013a: 233, note 54.  
7  For discussion of the revolt of Agis and the chronology see Bosworth 1988: 198-204. 
8  For the date of the Pythia see Wankel 1976: 33, note 83.  
9  Schaefer 1887: 225-227.  
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not renewed until after the trial. The offence for which Ctesiphon was indicted was 
committed when he proposed his bill in 336, and this offence was in no way mitigated by 
the subsequent expiration of the act of the Senate. A renewal of the same decree would 
probably been illegal while it was suspended under indictment; the proposal of a new 
decree in a different form would have required a new indictment to prevent it from being 
carried to the Assembly and passed like any other προβούλευμα.’10  Goodwin also cites the 
law at Dem. 23.92 for the view that Ctesiphon’s proposal would have expired after a year. 
The problem with Goodwin’s proposal is that both Aeschines and Demosthenes state that 
if Ctesiphon is acquitted, the terms of his decree will go into effect without any new 
decree.11 In his book on the procedure against illegal decrees, Hansen also believed that 
Ctesiphon’s decree would have expired by the time of his trial: ‘Ktesiphon is acquitted by 
the court, but Demosthenes cannot now be crowned because the decree is time-barred.’12 
MacDowell thought that Demosthenes could have been crowned, but that after Ctesiphon 
was acquitted, the expired probouleuma would then have to be proposed again with 
identical form and content and voted on again in the Council before being submitted again 
to the Assembly.13 In an essay on the time-limit in the graphe paranomon, Giannadaki has 
a similar view: ‘Dem. 23.92-93 suggests that a probouleuma which had not been enacted 
within a year became invalid; it was not merely suspended or ‘frozen’, as the speaker never 
challenges this in his anticipation of the argument of Aristocrates.’ She then speculates that 
‘Though it is impossible to determine with certainty how expired probouleumata, which 
were then declared legal by the court, were ratified, the most obvious and economical 
explanation would be that the court ruling would automatically reinstate the 
probouleuma.’14 Giannadaki provides no evidence to support this view.  
 
10  Goodwin 1901: 329-30.  
11  Wankel 1976: 19-20 sees the procedural problem, but does not propose a solution.  
12  Hansen 1974: 38.  
13  MacDowell 2009: 197, note 120. Cf. Cawkwell 1969: 166: ‘The case was not proceeded with until  
six years later in the early weeks of the year 330/29, although by then the προβούλευμα would have 
long lapsed.’ Cawkwell rightly notes however that there is no reason to believe that the proposal of 
Ctesiphon was revived in 330.  
14  Giannadaki 2014, 30. Cf. Giannadaki 2014, 31: ‘it is possible that if the decision was not made  
within a year, the probouleuma would be deemed to have expired and therefore, it would have to be 
reintroduced.’  
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 In a recent essay, E. Carawan revives Schaefer’s proposal, but adds several new 
details and a new scenario.15 According to Carawan, ‘the council of 330/29 resurrected the 
old probouleuma and thus the measure was at last introduced in the assembly, for the 
people to decide upon the old decree de novo.’ When the measure was finally introduced 
to the Assembly, Aeschines then ‘reasserted his challenge to it.’ At this meeting, the 
Assembly then passed a decree that ‘the issue be decided at trial: whoever challenged the 
measure as unlawful would face an assessed penalty, if he failed to win one fifth of the 
votes.’ Carawan further claims that this penalty set forth in the decree was different and 
greater than the standard penalty for accusers who did not gain at least one fifth of the 
votes.  
 This essay is divided into three parts. The first part re-examines the law at Dem. 
23.92 and shows that it makes decrees of the Council valid for only one year, that is, any 
decree of the Council expired after one year. The speaker claims that this law applied to 
probouleumata, but this must be a misinterpretation of the law. Because only decrees that 
had been enacted could be valid and because a probouleuma could not be valid before it 
was enacted by the Assembly, the law had nothing to do with probouleumata. This means 
that because there was no time-limit for submitting a probouleuma to a vote in the 
Assembly, there is no need to believe that Ctesiphon’s proposal was somehow brought 
back to life in 330. The second part of this essay examines the penalties for frivolous 
prosecution and shows that there is to need to believe that the Assembly created a new ad 
hoc penalty for Aeschines at the trial of Ctesiphon. What Demosthenes claims Aeschines 
would suffer for not gaining one fifth of the votes was the standard legal penalty. In the 
third part, trials created by decrees mentioned by Aeschines (3.4) are discussed. This phrase 
refers to trials heard in the Assembly and initiated by decrees, not to ad hoc arrangements 
for trials in court created by decrees. Trials in the courts were regulated by laws proposed 





15  Carawan 2019. Carawan’s view that Demosthenes compelled Aeschines to bring the case to court  
is similar to that of Burke 1977, but see Harris 1995: 173-4 for a detailed refutation. 
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I 
When analyzing the statements about laws presented in the speeches of the Attic 
orators, it is very important to distinguish between the actual terms of the law and the 
interpretation a litigant may give to this law. Take, for instance, the law about the award of 
crowns the subject of one of Aeschines’ charges in his indictment of Ctesiphon. This law 
forbade the award of a crown to an ἀρχή that was still subject to the procedure of euthynai 
(Aeschin. 3.31: ἕτερος [sc. νόμος] δ᾽ἀπαγορεύει ἀρχὴν ὑπεύθυνον μὴ στεφανοῦν). 
Aeschines (3.11: ἀπαγορεύει τοὺς ὑπευθύνους [sc. ἄρχοντας] μὴ στεφανοῦν. Cf. 26) 
assumes that the term in the law ἀρχή means ‘official’ and that the law made it illegal to 
award a crown to any official during his term of office before he passed the review of his 
conduct after his term of office. In his speech defending Ctesiphon, Demosthenes gives a 
different interpretation of the law. Demosthenes (18.113) notes that he was praised not for 
those duties for which his conduct was subject to review, but for his contribution (οὐ περὶ 
τούτων γε οὐδενὸς ὧν ὑπεύθυνος ἦν, ἀλλ᾽ἐφ᾽οἷς ἐπέδωκα). Demosthenes (18.117) then 
sums up his argument: ‘I made a contribution. I am praised for that reason. I am not subject 
to audit for what I gave. I was a magistrate. I underwent an examination for my term of 
office, not for what I contributed (ἐπέδωκα).’ Demosthenes clearly argues that the law 
applied only to decrees of praise for a magistrate’s overall performance of his duties in 
office and not to decrees of praise for individual acts of generosity during a term of office. 
One should also note that Demosthenes (18.114) cites several decrees in which the 
Assembly clearly followed his interpretation of the statute. Demosthenes (18.117) observes 
that ‘Each of these men, Aeschines, was subject to examination for the office which he 
held (τῆς μὲν ἀρχῆς ἧς ἦρχεν), but was not subject to examination for the actions for which 
he was awarded a crown.’
 
Finally, there are several inscriptions recording honorary decrees 
that confirm Demosthenes’ interpretation of the statute.16 If one had only the speech of 
Aeschines, one might assume that Aeschines’ interpretation was the standard interpretation 
of this statute, but fortunately Demosthenes’ speech has also survived as well as several 
inscriptions, which corroborate his interpretation and contradict that of Aeschines. This is 
 
16  See Harris 2017.  
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a very important point of methodology when analyzing the evidence about statutes 
presented by Athenian litigants.17  
One should also bear in mind that the legal case brought by Euthycles against the 
proposal of Aristocrates rests on a deliberate misinterpretation of a key legal term in the 
latter’s proposal. Euthycles quotes the key clause in the proposal: ‘After writing: “If 
someone kills Charidemus” and omitting how he does it, whether in our interests or not, he 
has immediately afterwards written: “he is subject to arrest from the territory of the allies”.’ 
(Dem. 23.16: “ἂν γὰρ ἀποκτείνῃ τις Χαρίδημον” γράψας καὶ παραβὰς τὸ τί πράττοντα 
εἰπεῖν, πότερ᾽ ἡμῖν συμφέροντα ἢ οὔ, γέγραφεν εὐθὺς “ἀγώγιμον ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων εἶναι.” 
Cf. 34). Euthycles interprets the word agogimos to mean that whoever catches the person 
who kills Charidemus can do anything to him he wishes: ‘He passes over the legally 
designated court and hands him over without trial to his accusers for them to do whatever 
they want to him, even if his guilt is not obvious. Those who catch him have the right to 
torture, maim, and collect money’ (Dem. 23.27-28). As several scholars have noted, this is 
not the standard meaning of the term agogimos, which normally means ‘subject to 
extradition’ (cf. Xen. Hell. 7.3.11: ἐψηφίσασθε δήπου τοὺς φυγάδας ἀγωγίμους εἶναι ἐκ 
πασῶν τῶν συμμαχίδων). The proposal of Aristocrates only meant that anyone who killed 
Charidemus would be arrested and extradited to Athens where he would be put on trial.  
This is not the only passage in the speech in which Euthycles gives a fallacious 
interpretation of a statute. Later in the speech Euthycles has the law about ad hominem 
legislation read out: ‘no law shall be passed regarding an individual unless it applies to all 
Athenians alike.’ Euthycles then observes that all decrees should conform to the laws and 
argues that the decree of Aristocrates is illegal because it applies only to Charidemus and 
not to all Athenians. The argument is fallacious because the law applies only to laws 
(nomoi) and not to decrees, which often contained provisions about individuals.18 If this 
interpretation of the law were correct, all the decrees of the Assembly awarding citizenship 
 
17  For other examples of trials in which litigants disagree about the meaning of a statute see Harris  
2013a: 175-245. 
18  See Canevaro 2013a: 74-5.  
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would have been illegal. If Euthycles is capable of misinterpreting the key word in a statute 
in these two passages, he is capable of doing the same elsewhere in his speech.19  
It is important to present the full text of the passage from Demosthenes Against 
Aristocrates (23.92).  
I think that he will also present the following argument and attempt in this way to 
mislead you: the decree is not in effect. It is a preliminary motion, but the law provides that 
decrees of the Council are in effect for one year. As a result, if you vote against it, the city 
will not suffer any serious harm.  
οἴομαι τοίνυν αὐτὸν κἀκεῖνον ἐρεῖν τὸν λόγον, καὶ σφόδρα ταύτῃ ζητήσειν 
ἐξαπατᾶν ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἄκυρόν ἐστι τὀ ψήφισμα. προβούλευμα γάρ ἐστιν, ὁ νόμος δ᾽ἐπέτεια 
κελεύει τὰ τῆς βουλῆς εἶναι ψηφίσματα, ὥστε κἂν αὐτοῦ νῦν ἀποψηφίσησθε, ἥ γε πόλις 
φλαῦρον οὐδὲν πείσεται κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο.  
First, it is important to distinguish what the law states and how Euthycles interprets 
the law. As Euthycles states, the law provides that decrees of the Council are in effect for 
one year. Euthycles then claims that this law applies to preliminary motions, which were 
moved in the Council and presented to the Assembly for confirmation or rejection. 
According to this view, if a preliminary motion was sent by the Council to the Assembly, 
but was blocked by a hypomosia in a public action against an illegal decree, it would expire 
after a year if the accuser did not bring his case to court within that period. In fact, Euthycles 
explicitly states that his delay in bringing his case to court has made the decree invalid 
(Dem. 23.93: οἱ δὲ γραψάμενοι καὶ χρόνους ἐμποιήσαντες καὶ δι᾽οὓς ἄκυρον ἐστιν). As a 
result, if a proposal was indicted by an accuser, but the court voted against the accuser and 
to uphold the proposal, the proposal could not be put to a vote in the Assembly if the trial 
did not occur within a year after the proposal was moved in the Council.  
The argument that the law about decrees of the Council applied to preliminary 
motions (probouleumata) must be fallacious. Because the speech of Aristocrates has not 
survived, it is impossible to know if he actually made this argument or not. Accusers were 
quite capable of claiming that their opponents would make a certain kind of argument, 
which they did not in fact make. For instance, Aeschines (3.13) claims that Demosthenes 
 
19  See Gernet in Gernet and Humbert 1959: 99-103; Lonis 1988; MacDowell 2009: 199-202; Harris  
2018: 24-25. On the arguments in this speech in general see now Esu 2020.  
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will argue that he was not an official when Ctesiphon proposed his decree of praise and 
that therefore the law about crowns did not apply to his proposal. In fact, Demosthenes 
does not use this argument in the published version of his speech, but as we have seen 
above, uses a different argument. But this makes no difference for the analysis of 
Euthycles’ point. The law cited by Euthycles applies to decrees of the Council, but could 
not have applied to preliminary motions. Preliminary motions could not be valid for a year 
or be made invalid by the passage of time if they were never enacted in the first place. The 
only motions that could be made invalid were the decrees voted by the Assembly (Dem. 
20.44; 24.9).20  
Second, the accuser in a public action against an illegal decree submitted as a 
probouleuma to the Assembly for a vote did not bring his action against a decree of the 
Council, but against a preliminary motion, which was an ‘opinion’ (γνώμη) of the Council 
introduced to the Assembly for a vote.21 ‘Opinion’ (γνώμη) is the term Aeschines (3.213) 
uses to denote Ctesiphon’s proposal, which is never called a decree of the Council (cf. 
Dem. 24.13). The precise terminology is very important in this case. When the Assembly 
invited the Council to make a proposal, it did not ask the Council to present a decree of the 
Council but an opinion for the Assembly to consider. For instance, before the trial of the 
generals after Arginousai in 406 BCE, the Assembly invited the Council to draft a 
preliminary proposal about the trial and to introduce it at the next meeting of the Assembly 
(Xen. Hell. 1.7.7: τὴν δὲ βουλὴν προβουλεύσασαν εἰσενεγκεῖν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ κρίνοιντο). At 
this meeting Callixeinus introduced the opinion (γνώμη), which had been drafted in the 
Council (Xen. Hell. 1.7.9: ἐντεῦθεν ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίουν, εἰς ἣν ἡ βουλὴ εἰσήνεγκε τὴν 
ἑαυτῆς γνώμην Καλλιξείνου εἰπόντος). After this proposal was introduced, Euryptolemus 
then attempted to stop the proposal from going forward by charging that it was illegal (Xen. 
Hell. 1.7.12: τὸν δὲ Καλλίξεινον προσεκαλέσαντο παράνομα φάσκοντες συγγεγραφέναι 
Εὐρυπτόλεμός τε ὁ Πεισιάνακτος καὶ ἄλλοι τινές). This is also the language one finds in 
 
20  The very confused scholion on the passage sees this point: τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι ἐπέτεια ὡς πρὸς τὰ ψηφίσματα  
τοῦ δήμου, ἐψεύσατο. ἄκυρον μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ μήπω κυρῶσαι τὸν δῆμον. For a complete text and 
translation see the Appendix. On the use of the term akyron in inscriptions see Dimopoulou 2014.  
21  It appears to have been possible to bring a graphe paranomon against a decree of the Council, but  
that would have been against a proposal about actions to be carried out by the Council about their 
duties ([Dem.] 47.34), not about a preliminary motion introduced to the Assembly by the Council 
about general matters to be decided by the Assembly.  
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probouleumatic decrees of the Assembly.22 For instance, in a decree of the Council and 
Assembly dated to 375/4, the Assembly invited the Council to submit its opinion about the 
Corcyreans, the Acarnanians and the Cephallenians (IG II2 96, lines 11-13: γν[ώ]μ[η]|ν δὲ 
ξυμβάλλεσθαι τῆς β[ουλῆς ὅτι δοκεῖ] τῆι βουλῆ|ι). There are dozens of examples, and in 
each case the proposal submitted to the Assembly is never called a decree of the Council, 
but an ‘opinion of the Council.’  In fact, the evidence from the trial of Ctesiphon reveals 
that this law clearly did not apply to preliminary motions (probouleumata) because both 
Aeschines (3.153-6, 253-4, 259) and Demosthenes (18.85, 266) assume that if Ctesiphon 
is acquitted, his proposal to crown Demosthenes and to have his honors announced in the 
theater can go into effect. The problem identified by earlier scholars turns out to be non-
existent. 
There is another case in which an accuser indicted an honorary decree and the case 
did not come to trial for several years. Demosthenes (18.222-3) mentions a decree of honors 
indicted by Diondas, who did not receive one fifth of the votes at the trial, and mentions 
Demomeles and Hyperides as the proposers (cf. [Plut.] X orat. 848e-f). The new Hyperides 
papyrus has now provided information about the case. Hyperides proposed his decree 
before the battle of Chaeronea, but the case did not come to court until four years later.23 
Despite the delay, the decree of Hyperides still went into effect because Demosthenes had 
it read out to the court in 330.24 Diondas appears to have brought his case against the decree 
of Hyperides before it was put to a vote in the Assembly as in the case of the decree of 
Ctesiphon because Hyperides refers to his proposal as a probouleuma (144v8: 
προεβούλευσα).  This provides another example in which a probouleuma was indicted, but 
the trial did not take place until several years later. After the accuser lost his case, the 
proposal was enacted by the Assembly.  
The law about decrees of the Council clearly applies to decisions enacted by the 
Council about the activities of the Council, not about motions to be introduced to the 
Assembly.25 The law was clearly aimed at defining the powers and jurisdiction of the 
 
22  On probouleumatic decrees see Rhodes 1972: 52-82. 
23  See Horvath 2008: 27-28. For the text see Horvath 2014.  
24  If the proposal was not passed, there would have been no copy kept in the archive. See Harris 1995:  
14. 
25  Rhodes 1972: 63 believes that the limit of one year applying to probouleumata was the bouleutic  
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Council. The Athenians were very concerned about delineating the powers and 
jurisdictions of various political bodies and magistracies. For instance, the Areopagus was 
allowed to impose fines, but only up to a certain amount ([Dem.] 59.80). The Council was 
also restricted to imposing fines of no more than five hundred drachmas ([Dem.] 47.43 Cf. 
IG I3 34, lines 38-9). The powers of the Council were strictly circumscribed also by the 
oath members swore.  The members of the Council promised not to put any Athenian who 
provides three sureties in prison except in cases of treason, plotting against the democracy 
or failing to make payments for collecting taxes (Dem. 24.144). In the decree about Chalcis 
the members of the Council and the judges swear not drive out Chalcidians from Chalcis, 
to destroy the city, to punish anyone with exile or put to death or confiscate property 
without the approval of the Athenian people (IG I3 34 [446/5?], lines 3-10).  This law 
limited the powers of the Council by limiting the validity of their decrees to one year. 
Unlike the Assembly, which could enact decrees or laws that were valid indefinitely, this 
law restricted the Council to passing measures whose validity expired after a year. This is 
certainly consistent with the attested decrees of the Council in the sources.26 In 415, the 
Council voted to have the generals summon citizens in Athens in arms to the agora, those 
living within the Long Walls to the Theseum, those in the Piraeus to the agora of 
Hippodamus and the cavalry to the Anakeion (Andoc. 1.45). A little after 403/2 the Council 
voted to have the decree of the Assembly about the proxeny of the sons of Apemantus 
reinscribed because it had been destroyed by the Thirty (IG II
2
 6). In the winter of 370/69 
the Council passed a decree to call a meeting of the Assembly immediately (Xen. Hell. 
6.5.33). In 357 the Council voted to allow trierarchs to recover naval equipment by any 
means necessary ([Dem.] 47.44). This decree was passed to implement a general decree of 
the Assembly ([Dem.] 47.20, 44). In 346 Demosthenes moved in the Council that Philip’s 
ambassadors be assigned front-row seats (proedria) in the theater at the Dionysia (Aeschin. 
2.55, 110; 3.76). He also passed a decree awarding crowns of wild olive to the members of 
the First Embassy to Philip (Aeschin. 2.46). A little later Demosthenes passed a decree in 
 
year, but Giannadaki 2014: 22, note 42 rightly rejects this because it would make decrees voted at 
different times valid for different lengths of time.  
26  For the decrees of the Council in the fourth century see Liddel 2020: 966-71. See also Rhodes 1972:  
82-87. One should not include in this group the decree of the Council about Antiphon and others 
([Plut.] X orat. 833d-834b) because this document is a forgery. See Harris 2021.  
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the Council instructing the members of the Second Embassy to proceed to Philip and to 
have him swear the oaths to the peace treaty with the Athenians (Dem. 19.154; Aeschin. 
2.91). In each case the decree was to take effect immediately and did not enact a rule for 
the future. One should also note that when the Assembly delegated powers to the Council 
or gave the Council an order, it was always to do something immediately.27 As Rhodes has 
observed, ‘In times of democratic government the decrees of the boule remained subsidiary 
to those of the ecclesia.’28 One can see this principle enunciated in a decree of the Assembly 
delegating powers to the Council about preparing the fleet ‘provided that the Council does 
not cancel any of the decisions voted by the people’ (IG II2 1629 (325/4), lines 264–69 (τὴν 
βουλὴν | κυρίαν εἶναι ψηφίζεσθαι | μὴ λύουσαν μηθὲν τῶν | ἐψηφισμένων τῶι δήμωι). Like 
the restrictions expressed in the oath of the Council, this law restricted the powers of the 
Council by limiting the duration of its decrees to one year. But this had nothing to do with 
the preliminary motions (probouleumata) submitted to the Assembly. 
 
27  IG II2 127 (356/5), lines 34–5 (τ[ὴ]ν [β]ουλ[ὴν] κυ[ρ]ίαν εἶναι); IG II2 204 (352/1), lines 85–6 (τὴν  
βουλὴν κυρίαν εἶνα|[ι ψηφίζεσθαι ὅτι ἂν αὐτῆι δ]οκῆι ἄριστον εἶναι); Dem. 19,154 (τὴν βουλὴν 
ποιήσαντος τοῦ δήμου κυρίαν); IG II2 435 (after 336), lines 7–9 (τὴν β[ουλὴν κυρίαν εἶναι 
ψηφίζ]|[εσθαι ὅτι ἂν α]ὐτῆι δοκῆι ἄριστ[ον εἶναι). 
28  Rhodes 1972: 87. One referee observes: “è vero che un probouleuma viene presentato come una  
gnome, ma rimane il fatto che nel prescritto di un decreto probuleumatico la formula è edoxe tei 
boulei kai toi demoi, il che parrebbe porre le delibere dei due organi sullo stesso piano.” Pace the 
reader, the formula does not indicate that the two bodies were on the same footing. The phrase means 
in effect that the following measure was voted by the Council as a proposal, which was then 
submitted to the Assembly, which then ratified the proposal and thereby transformed what was only 
proposal without legal force into a decree, which was legally binding. One needs to bear in mind 
that the Assembly did not just ratify proposals made by the Council, but often added riders, which 
supplemented the provisions of the decree of the Council and had not been approved by the Council. 
Conversely, the Council did not have the power to add riders to decrees of the Assembly, which 
demonstrates that the two bodies were not on the same footing. The interpretation of the formula 
edoxe tei boulei kai toi demoi should not be used as evidence that the proposals of the Council 
introduced to the Assembly were on the same footing as decrees of the Assembly. See IG II2, 1 
[405/4], lines 52-54: ἐψηφίσθαι δὲ Ἀθηναίων τῶι δήμωι κύρια |  
[ε ̓͂ναι τὰ ἐψηφισ]μένα πρότερον περὶ Σαμίων καθάπερ ἡ βολῆ προβολεύσασα | [ἐς τὸν δῆμον 
ἐσ]ήνεγκεν). This shows very clearly that what made the proposal introduced by the Council legally 
binding (kyria) was the vote of the Assembly, not the vote of the Council and the vote of the 
Assembly combined. The referee also observes the phrase ὅτι δο[κ]εῖ τῆ[ι] βου[λῆι (IG II2, 96, lines 
12-13. Cf. 103, line 18). This phrase does not refer to a measure that is legally binding on the 
Athenian people, but only that whatever the Council decides to introduce as a proposal to the 
Assembly will be introduced as a proposal. The phrase does not indicate that the decision of the 
Council was binding. The Assembly is inviting the Council to make a proposal; the Assembly is not 
granting to the Council the power of making a legally binding proposal.  The formula for that is very 
different - see note 29. 
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A correct understanding of the law about decrees of the Assembly shows that there 
is no reason to believe that the Council ‘revived’ the decree of Ctesiphon in 330 as a way 
of forcing Aeschines to bring his case to court. As Euthycles states (Dem. 23.93), it was 
the accusers who could delay a trial, not the defendant and his allies.29 As Cawkwell, has 
rightly observed, Demosthenes (18.308) clearly implies that Aeschines was the one who 
decided to bring the case to court because recent events favored an attack (εἶτ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτῳ 
τῷ καιρῷ ῥήτωρ ἐξαίφνης ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἐφάνη).30 The event that clearly 
made Aeschines (3.132) think that the moment had arrived was the decisive defeat of 
Darius at Gaugamela in 331. This is the reason why one of the most serious charges 
Aeschines (3.156, 173, 239-40, 257-9) makes against Demosthenes is that he has accepted 
Persian gold.31 When analyzing the reasons why the case against Ctesiphon came to court 
in 330, therefore, one needs to examine the advantages for Aeschines and his motives.  
 
II  
In his speech at the trial of Ctesiphon, Demosthenes twice mentions the possibility 
that the judges will punish Aeschines with a form of atimia (loss of rights).32 First, 
Demosthenes (18.82) replies to Aeschines’ charge that he keeps silent after receiving 
money. He replies by attacking Aeschines for never stopping his chatter and complains that 
nothing will shut him up unless the judges stop him from talking by inflicting atimia on 
him (ἐὰν μή σ᾽οὗτοι παύσωσιν ἀτιμώσαντες τήμερον).33 Later in the speech Demosthenes 
(18.266) accuses Aeschines of being a sycophant (σοὶ δὲ συκοφάντῃ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν 
 
29  Pace Carawan 2019.  
30  Cawkwell 1969: 167. 
31  There is no reason however to follow Cawkwell 1969, who believes that it was Demosthenes’ failure  
to support the revolt of Agis and the king’s defeat that caused Aeschines to bring his case to court. 
See Harris 1995: 173.  
32  I discussed the evidence for the penalty imposed for frivolous prosecution in Harris 1999, which  
was reprinted in my book Harris 2006: 405-422. For some reason, Carawan 2019 does not cite either 
the article or the book. The analysis of the article has been endorsed by Daix and Fernandez 2017: 
355, note 364 (‘les exposés convaincants de Harris’) and Horváth 2019: 135, note 13. Wallace 2006 
follows my analysis but claims the penalty for not following through was only the fine of one 
thousand drachmas. See however the detailed refutation in Harris 2006b.  
33  Yunis 2001: 156-7 sees that Demosthenes is alluding to the penalty for failing to gain one-fifth of  
the votes, but mistakenly follows Hansen 1991: 192 in believing that this only barred the accuser 
from bringing the same type of charge again.  
94 The Crown Trial and Athenian Legal Procedure in Public Cases against Illegal Decrees 
 
Dike - 22 (2019): 81-111 
 
ὑπάρχει), that is, a person who brings false charges in court.34 According to Demosthenes, 
the risk Aeschines runs at this trial is whether he will be able to continue this activity (δεῖ 
σ᾽ ἔτι τοῦτο ποιεῖν) or will be forced to stop by not gaining one fifth of the votes (πεπαῦσθαι 
μὴ μεταλαβόντα τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων). This clearly implies that the penalty 
Aeschines will suffer will put an end of his career of bringing public charges, not to some 
more serious form of atimia.  
Carawan however claims that ‘Demosthenes is insisting upon a more radical loss 
of rights; for if Aeschines faced only the fine and the bar to graphai of one sort or another, 
it would hardly silence him in the assembly and at trial for other remedies.’35  This is not 
convincing for two reasons. First, Demosthenes is clearly referring to Aeschines’ activities 
in court, not to his political activity in general. Second, the penalty for failing to gain one 
fifth of the votes was the loss of the right to bring any public actions in the future, not just 
the loss to bring one or two kinds of public prosecution. It is important to review the all the 
pertinent evidence, because Carawan selects only one passage and pays no attention to 
other relevant passages.   
First, there is a fragment of Theophrastus preserved in a scholion to Dem. 22.3 (13b 
Dilts): Ἀθήνησι οὖν ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἀγῶσιν, ἐὰν μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτπον μέρος, χιλίας 
ἀποτίνει καὶ ἔτι πρόσεστί τις ἀτιμία οἷον τὸ ἐξεῖναι μήτε γράψασθαι παρανόμον μήτε 
φαίνειν μήτε ἐφηγεῖσθαι.  
 At Athens in public cases, if someone does not gain a share of one fifth [of the 
votes], he owes a fine of one thousand drachmas and there is in addition a certain loss of 
rights such as the ability to bring a public action against an illegal action or a phasis or an 
ephegesis. 
It is important to have the correct text with the reading of the manuscript.36 This 
fragment clearly shows that the unsuccessful accuser lost the general right to bring public 
cases, not just the right to bring certain types of cases. Like the passage of Demosthenes, 
 
34  On the term sycophant see the excellent study of Harvey 1990, who decisively refutes Osborne  
1990. 
35  Carawan 2019: 119.  
36  The reading παρανόμον is the reading of A, the only manuscript which has this scholion. Reiske  
proposed emending this to παρανόμων, but the emendation is unnecessary; see Harris 1992: 79-80. 
Carawan 2019: 114 claims that I rely on a ‘variant in schol. Dem. 22 (at §3)’ but this is not true. 
This is not a variant, but the only reading in the only manuscript carrying the scholion.  
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the fragment of Theophrastus shows that the penalty was automatic once an accuser did 
not gain one-fifth of the votes. It was not imposed by another vote afterwards. This is 
confirmed by Apollodorus in his apographe against Nicostratus ([Dem.] 53.1): he states 
that if he loses his case, he runs the risk of never bringing another public case (τοῦ μηδέποτε 
μηδένα αὖθις ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ γράψασθαι). The second speech Against Aristogeiton in the 
demosthenic corpus is a forgery probably composed in the Hellenistic period,37 but the 
author had some knowledge of Athenian law, because he states that when the prosecutor 
does not gain one-fifth of the votes in a public case, he loses the right to bring a graphe, an 
apagoge or an ephegesis in the future ([Dem.] 26.9: τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ γράφεσθαι μηδ᾽ἀπάγειν 
μηδ᾽ἐφηγεῖσθαι). These passages also indicate that the penalty was automatic; it was not 
imposed by a vote of the judges. 
Other sources also mention the atimia as a penalty without indicating what right is 
lost. Hyperides (Eux. 34) states that Tisis of Agryle failed to gain one fifth of the votes and 
suffered atimia. Andocides (1.33) makes a similar statement and later mentions a form of 
atimia in which the person is not allowed to bring public actions (75: οὐκ ἦν γράψασθαι). 
Pollux (8.53) provides similar information, but does not specify what rights the accuser 
loses.  
καίτοι γε ὁ Θεόφραστος τοὺς μὲν ἄλλας γραφὰς γραψαμένους χιλίας 
τ᾽ὀφλισκάνειν, εἰ τὸ  πέμπτον τῶν ψήφων μὴ καταλάβοιεν, καὶ προσατιμοῦσθαι, τοὺς δὲ 
εἰσαγγέλλοντας μὴ ἀτιμοῦσθαι μέν, ὀφλεῖν δὲ τὰς χίλιας.  
On the other hand, Carawan pays no attention to these passages but relies on another 
version of the law from Theophrastus (fr. 636c Fortenbaugh) found in Lex. Cant. s.v. 
πρόστιμον.  
ἔκειτο τῷ μὴ μεταλαβόντι τὸ πέμπτον τῶν ψήφων, ὡς Θεόφραστος ἐν πέμπτῳ Περὶ 
νόμων. ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοσίοις ἀγῶσι ἐζημιοῦντο χιλίαις καὶ πρόσεστί τις ἀτιμία, ὥστε μὴ 
ἐξεῖναι μήτε γράψασθαι παρανόμων μήτε φαίνειν μήτε ἐφηγεῖσθαι. ἐὰν δέ τις γραψάμενος 
μὴ ἐπεξέλθῃ, ὁμοίως. περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰσαγγελίας, ἐάν τις μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον τῶν ψήφων, 
οἱ δικασταὶ τιμῶσιν.  
There was a penalty for the one who did not gain one-fifth of the votes as 
Theophrastus  states in his On Laws. In public cases they were penalized one thousand 
 
37  For the evidence against authenticity see Harris 2018a: 193-229. 
96 The Crown Trial and Athenian Legal Procedure in Public Cases against Illegal Decrees 
 
Dike - 22 (2019): 81-111 
 
drachmas and  there was in addition a certain form of atimia so that it was not permitted to 
bring public actions against illegal proposals or a phasis or an ephegesis. If anyone who 
brought a public charge did not follow through (i.e. bring the case to court), there was a 
similar penalty. As for eisangelia, if anyone did not gain one-fifth of the votes, the judges 
evaluated the penalty.38  
This evidence is similar to that of the other version of the fragment, but gives the 
impression that the loss of rights was more limited. But this is contradicted by the evidence 
of the other version of the fragment, which is confirmed by the evidence from the orators, 
especially Dem. 53.1 and [Dem.] 26.9. And the information given in this passage about 
eisangelia is contradicted by the evidence from Pollux (8.53). This version of the fragment 
is clearly not reliable and should not be used to argue for a more limited form of atimia.  
 Carawan then draws attention to the evidence from several lives of Aeschines. The 
first is from the life of Aeschines in the Lives of the Ten Orators ([Plut.] X orat. 840c0d).  
 χρόνῳ δ᾽ ὕστερον, Φιλίππου μὲν τετελευτηκότος Ἀλεξάνδρου δὲ διαβαίνοντος εἰς 
τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἐγράψατο Κτησιφῶντα παρανόμων ἐπὶ ταῖς Δημοσθένους τιμαῖς: οὐ 
μεταλαβὼν δὲ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων ἔφυγεν εἰς τὴν Ῥόδον, χιλίας δραχμὰς ὑπὲρ 
τῆς ἥττης οὐ  βουληθεὶς καταθέσθαι. οἱ δ᾽ ἀτιμίας αὐτῷ προστιμηθῆναι λέγουσιν οὐ 
θέλοντι ἐξελθεῖν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἔφεσον ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον. 
 Sometime later, after Philip died and Alexander crossed to Asia, he brought a 
charge of proposing an illegal decree against Ctesiphon for the honors for Demosthenes. 
Not gaining one-fifth of the votes, he left for Rhodes, not wishing to pay the one thousand 
drachmas for his defeat. Others state that he was given an additional loss of rights that 
forced him to leave the city against his will, and he went to Alexander at Ephesus.  
The reliability of this passage is called into question by the assertion that Aeschines 
brought his charge against Ctesiphon after Philip’s death. In fact, we know that the charge 
was brought during Philip’s lifetime and before Alexander crossed to Asia (see above). 
This source then states that Aeschines did not gain one fifth of the votes, but did not wish 
to pay the fine of one thousand drachmas and left for Rhodes. This is consistent with the 
 
38  Sato 2015: 45-46 claims that the penalties for not following through on public cases ‘were not  
automatically inflicted in addition to the original one,’ but this is contradicted by the evidence of 
Dem. 21.103, which shows that the penalty was automatic and thus confirms the evidence of 
Theophrastus. Cf. Dem. 58.8 where the penalty is also automatic without being voted by a court.  
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information about the penalty for not gaining one fifth of the votes examined above. The 
alternative version claims that Aeschines suffered some loss of rights that forced him to 
flee to Alexander at Ephesus. This information is also suspect because by the time 
Aeschines lost his case against Ctesiphon in 330, Alexander was far away from Ephesus. 
This in turn casts doubt on the information about the additional penalty, which appears to 
have been invented to explain why Aeschines left Athens.39  
 The Life of Aeschines attributed to Apollonius has a different version of events. 
 καὶ ὁρίσαντος τὸ πρόστιμον ἐὰν μὴ δείξῃ αὐτὸ παράνομον καὶ ἡττηθέντος καὶ διὰ 
τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι καταβαλεῖν τὴν καταδἰκην, ἣν αὐτὸς ὥρισε, φυγῇ χρησαμένου.  
 He set a penalty if he did not prove that it (the decree) was illegal and defeated and 
unable to pay the judgment, which he had set, he went into exile.  
This version has Aeschines set a penalty for himself if he did not prove the charge, 
but there is no parallel in Athenian law for an accuser setting a penalty for himself. This 
version has something in common with the life of Aeschines in the Lives of the Ten Orators 
by stating that he could not pay the fine, but otherwise the two versions cannot be 
reconciled. The passage says nothing about a penalty set by the court.  
 Photius (Bibl. I. 59 Henry) has still another version of events.  
καὶ ὁρίσας τὸ πρόστιμον αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ, ἐὰν μὴ δείξῃ παράνομον, μὴ δείξας ὡς ὑπέσχετο 
ἐξέπεσε τῆς πατρίδος.  
 And he set the penalty for himself if he did not show that the decree was illegal, 
and when he did not show this as he promised, he was expelled from the country.   
As for the previous life of Aeschines, there is no evidence for an accuser in 
Athenian law ever setting a penalty for himself for not proving a charge. This passage 
certainly cannot be used as evidence to show that a special ad hoc penalty was created for 
Aeschines at the trial of Ctesiphon.  
 In short, there is no reason to believe that the penalty of atimia for not gaining one-
fifth of the votes threatened by Demosthenes was any other than the standard penalty in the 
laws, which was the loss of the right to bring any public actions in the future. Demosthenes 
is not alluding to any special penalty created on an ad hoc basis by a decree of the 
Assembly. 
 
39  Similar information is found in Vita Aeschinis 2 and is suspect for the same reasons.  
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 Carawan has drawn attention to a passage in which Aeschines (3.4) complains 
about certain corrupt practices in the Assembly and courts.40 Aeschines alleges that some 
people carelessly make illegal proposals and others, who were not selected honestly to 
serve as proedroi but through a plot, put these proposals to a vote. If a member of the 
Council does obtain his position by lot and honestly declares votes, men who consider the 
constitution not the common possession of all citizens, but their own private property 
threaten charges to denounce them, making slaves of private citizens and seizing power for 
themselves. These same men overturn the  trials established by the laws and judge cases 
with decrees through an appeal to anger.  
 Aeschines makes a contrast between trials conducted according to the laws and 
trials according to decree. Carawan claims that the latter are trials in court regulated by ad 
hoc decrees passed by the Assembly. This is very unlikely, and Carawan provides no 
parallels to support his view. On the other hand, it is well known that the procedures about 
trials for homicide were regulated by the laws of Draco, which were protected by a strict 
entrenchment clause (Dem. 23.62). The early laws of Solon were also protected by strong 
oaths and probably by entrenchment clauses (Hdt. 1.29; Plut. Solon 25). In fact, when the 
Athenians reformed their basic institutions in 411, they had to place a ban on public charges 
against illegal decrees, which would suggest that the important laws governing the Council, 
Assembly and courts were guarded by harsh penalties against changing their basic 
provisions (Thuc. 8.67.2). After the new procedures for legislation enacted in 403, new 
laws about substantive and procedural matters had to follow several steps.41 First, a 
preliminary vote in the Assembly could take place at any time during the year to permit 
proposals for new laws (Dem. 24.25). Second, all new proposals for laws had to be placed 
in front of the monument of the Eponymous Heroes so that everyone could read them 
(Dem. 24.25; Dem. 20.94). Third, the secretary was to read out all proposals submitted at 
 
40  Carawan 2019: 116 (the passages ‘describes just the sort of rule-bending required to bring  
Ctesiphon’s proposal back to life’).  
41  For the procedure in nomothesia see Canevaro 2013b, who shows that the document at Dem. 24.20- 
23 is a forgery. Cf. Canevaro 2013a: 80-104. Hansen 2016 has attempted to defend the authenticity 
of the document, but for a detailed refutation of Hansen’s analysis see Canevaro 2018. The reply of 
Hansen 2019 is not convincing and repeats his previous mistakes. See Canevaro 2020.  
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every meeting of the Assembly until nomothetai were appointed (Dem. 20.94). Fourth, 
during the third meeting of the Assembly after the preliminary vote, the people were to 
discuss the selection of nomothetai and pass a decree appointing them (Dem. 24.25; Dem. 
20.92). Fifth, synegoroi were to be elected to defend any laws to be repealed before the 
new laws could be enacted (Dem. 24.36; Dem. 20.146). Sixth, any laws contrary to the new 
proposals for laws had to be repealed by a public action against inexpedient laws (Dem. 
24.32; 34–5; Dem. 20.93). Seventh, if the person who proposed a new law did not follow 
these rules, anyone who wished could bring a public action against him on a charge of 
enacting an inexpedient law (Dem. 24.32). Eighth, the Assembly sitting as nomothetai 
enacted the new law (Dem. 20.94. Cf. Aeschin. 3.39).42 If the legal procedures of the courts 
were regulated by the laws, what were trials conducted according to decrees?  
 For the vast majority of cases, trials were held in the courts, but according to 
Aristotle in the Politics (4.1298a) the deliberative part of the state, that is the Council and 
Assembly, has authority in matters pertaining to sentences of death and exile, confiscation 
of property and the accountability of officials.  The law of Cannonus authorized trials for 
treason in the Assembly and set the penalty of death confiscation of property with one-
tenth given to Athena (Xen. Hell. 1.7.20, 34). Later in the fifth century, Aristarchus was 
tried for betraying the fort at Oenoe in the Assembly through this procedure (Thuc. 8.98; 
Xen. Hell. 1.7.28). In other cases, however, it was possible to create an ad hoc procedure 
for a trial in the Assembly by decree. The best known example of such a trial is the case 
against the generals after the battle of Arginousai in 406. The generals had instructed the 
trierarchs to rescue those shipwrecked and to recover the dead, but a storm prevented them, 
and many Athenians drowned. On their return to Athens, the generals made a report to the 
Council about the storm. Timocrates proposed that the generals should be imprisoned and 
handed over to the Assembly for trial. The Council accepted this proposal (1.7.3: μετὰ δὲ 
ταῦτα ἐν τῇ βουλῇ διηγοῦντο οἱ στρατηγοὶ περί τε τῆς ναυμαχίας καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ 
χειμῶνος. Τιμοκράτους δ᾽ εἰπόντος ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους χρὴ δεθέντας εἰς τὸν δῆμον 
παραδοθῆναι, ἡ βουλὴ ἔδησε). The Council was acting on its power to imprison individuals 
accused of wrongdoing (Dem. 24.144). The Council did not prescribe any procedure at this 
 
42  On the identity of the nomothetai in legislative procedure see Harris 2018b: 207-8 and Canevaro  
2020: 27, note 4. Cf. Canevaro and Esu 2018.  
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point about a trial. It is clear that the Council placed the matter of the generals on the agenda 
of the next meeting of the Assembly. There is no indication that it was making any 
recommendation. There is also a clear distinction made between the case of the generals 
and the case involving Erasinides about embezzlement, which was tried in court. 
 At the meeting of the Assembly, many speakers attacked the generals. The word 
κατηγόρουν is used, but this need not mean a formal accusation at this point. These are 
speeches made in a normal debate in the Assembly. In the context of this debate, the 
generals reply to the criticisms but rather briefly (οἱ στρατηγοὶ βραχέως ἕκαστος 
ἀπελογήσατο). Xenophon (Hell. 1.7.) adds that they were not given the amount of time to 
speak in accordance with the law (οὐ γὰρ προυτέθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον). At the 
next meeting of the Assembly, Callixeinus argued that these speeches were in effect their 
answers to the charges. They also provide witnesses that the storm prevented the recovery 
of the bodies (Xen. Hell. 1.7.6).  
 At this point, several people volunteered to act as sureties (ἐγγυᾶσθαι) for the 
generals, which would allow them to leave prison until the next meeting (1.7.7.). There 
was then a formal vote to delay a final decision until the next meeting (ἔδοξε δὲ 
ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς ἑτέραν ἐκκλησίαν) and an order given to the Council to propose a 
introduce a probouleuma at the next meeting about how to judge the generals (τὴν δὲ 
βουλὴν προβουλεύσασαν εἰσενεγκεῖν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ οἱ ἄνδρες κρίνοιντο). This would appear 
to indicate that what had happened so far is not part of a trial, which would take place at 
the next meeting. This turns out to be a key point, because at the next meeting Callixeinus 
claims that the previous meeting of the Assembly afforded the generals a chance to make 
their defence. Euryptolemus objects to this argument on the grounds that the amount of 
time was not sufficient. It is important to note what is implicit in this decree of the 
Assembly, namely, that the Assembly has the right to ask the Council to create an ad hoc 
judicial procedure to try people in the Assembly. This is similar to the request of the 
Assembly in the Eretria decree (340s) in which the Assembly creates a crime (IG II3 399, 
lines 9-11: ἐὰν]| δέ τις τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐπιστρα[τεύσηι ἐπὶ Ἐρέ]|τριαν ἢ ἐπ’ ἄλλην τινὰ 
τῶν συμμαχί[δων πόλεων) and a penalty (IG II3 399, lines 12-15: θάνατον αὐτοῦ]| 
κατεγνῶσθαι καὶ τὰ χρήματα δ[ημόσια εἶναι καὶ τ]|ῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ εἶν[αι τὰ 
χρήματα αὐτοῦ]| ἀγώγιμα ἐξ ἁπάσων τῶν πόλεω[ν τῶν συμμαχίδων), then invites the 
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Council to introduce a proposal about how to enforce this rule and impose this penalty (IG 
II
3 
399, lines 6-9: περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστρ[ατευσάντων ἐπὶ τ]|[ὴ]ν χώραν τὴν Ἐρετριέων τὴν 
βουλ[ὴν προβουλεύσα]|σαν ἐξενε[γ]κεῖν εἰς τὸν δῆμον εἰ[ς τὴν πρώτην ἐκκ]|λησίαν, ὅπως 
ἂν [δ]ίκην δῶσιν κατὰ [τὰς σπόνδας). It is also crucial to note that no one objected to the 
Assembly’s right to create an ad hoc procedure for trying people in the Assembly. 
 Between the two meetings the Apaturia took place, and Theramenes had the 
relatives of the victims dress in mourning. In Diodorus (13.101-2) this takes place in the 
Assembly at the final meeting. At the meeting of the Council certain people allegedly 
bribed Callixenus to accuse the generals (Καλλίξενον ἔπεισαν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ κατηγορεῖν τῶν 
στρατηγῶν). Is this a formal accusation or just an attack on the generals? If it is a formal 
accusation, the previous charges in the Assembly cannot have been formal accusations. At 
the next meeting of the Assembly, Callixenus introduces the motion of the Council as 
instructed by the Assembly at the previous meeting. This proposal starts with a clause of 
justification giving the grounds for the proposal (ἐπειδὴ τῶν τε κατηγορούντων κατὰ τῶν 
στρατηγῶν καὶ ἐκείνων ἀπολογουμένων ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀκηκόασι). This is a key 
part of the proposal because it claims that the defendants have had the right to answer the 
charges at the previous meeting. This is of course misleading because no formal charges 
had been made at the previous meeting. There was only a discussion of the matter on the 
agenda. After Callixeinus made his proposal in the Assembly, Euryptolemus threatened to 
bring a graphe paranomon. Later in the debate, Euryptolemus states that if the Athenians 
try the generals following the proposal of Callixeinus, they will be violating the law 
requiring that no citizen be put to death without a trial (Xen. Hell. 1.7.25: τούτους 
ἀπολλύντες ἀκρίτους παρὰ τὸν νόμον).43 
 Hansen has claimed that the trial of the generals in the Assembly was a case of 
eisangelia for three reasons: 1) the generals were removed by apocheirotonia; 2) the 
Council was involved, and 3) the case was tried by the people.44 There are several decisive 
objections against Hansen’s view. First and above all, the noun eisangelia and the verb 
 
43  For this law see Lys. 22.2; Dem. 23.27, 36 with Harris 2013: 241-3. Cf. IG I
3
 40, lines 8-10.  
Carawan 2010:37 claims that ‘Euryptolemos cannot point to any language in law that expressly bars 
or preempts Kallixeinos’ procedure’, but these passages show that this view is mistaken.  
44  Hansen 1975: 84-86.  
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eisangellein are not found in the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus. Second, the actions 
of the general do not fit into any of the categories of the eisangelia law (Hyp. Eux. 7-8; 
Lex. Cant. s.v. εἰσαγγελία; Pollux 8.52): 1) attempting to overthrow the democracy, 2) 
treason, that is, betraying forts or military units to the enemy, and 3) taking money for not 
giving the best advice to the people. Third, the motion of Callixeinus must be an ad hoc 
procedure because if Callixeinus were following an established law, there would be no 
need to specify the manner of voting. For instance, when the accuser indicated the 
procedure selected in this plaint, he did not need to set out the steps to be followed because 
they were already established by law. It also appears that this is no secret ballot because 
everyone was to be given one pebble and to place it in one urn or the other. The proposal 
also sets the penalty; if Callixeinus were following an established law, the penalty would 
have been fixed (or a timesis), and there would have been no need to specify it. And if 
Callixeinus were following an established legal procedure, no one could accuse him of 
proposing an illegal decree.45 On the other hand, because the procedure was an ad hoc 
measure created by a decree, it is easy to see how Euryptolemus could bring a graphe 
paranomon. 
 After Euryptolemus threatened to bring a charge against the proposal of 
Callixeinus, the people then shouted that the Assembly should be able to do whatever it 
wishes. No one challenges the right of the Assembly to pass a motion creating a legal 
procedure for a trial in the Assembly. The objection is that this motion violates rules about 
procedure, not about the powers of the Assembly. Euryptolemus does not argue that the 
trial cannot take place in the Assembly because the Assembly does not have the power to 
try such cases (Xen. Hell. 1.7.12-13).  
 The main objection of Euryptolemus is that the procedure proposed in this ad hoc 
measure should follow standard legal procedure but does not (Xen. Hell. 1.7.23-25). 
 This also makes it clear that this is an ad hoc procedure, not one according to established 
law. In standard procedure, the day is divided into three parts and the defendant receives 
one third to answer the charges. This objection is also made in Xenophon’s account of the 
 
45  The fact that the proposal was illegal is confirmed by other sources. See Xen. Mem. 1.1.18; Plat.  
Apol. 32b-c; Gorg. 473e 
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previous meeting of the Assembly. The important matter is that the incident reveals that 
the Assembly could create an ad hoc trial by decree just as Aeschines (3.4) says.  
 In his account of the trial of Phocion, Plutarch (Phoc. 34-35) provides a detailed 
account of another trial held according to a decree in 318. Phocion had gone to meet 
Alexander and Polyperchon in Phocis, but the Athenians passed a decree proposed by 
Hagnonides denouncing him and sent an embassy to join them (Plut. Phoc. 33.1-7). 
Phocion and his associates were arrested and sent back to Athens (Plut. Phoc. 34.1). 
Plutarch appears to be drawing on a source favorable to Phocion and hostile to Athenian 
democracy, which claims that the meeting of the Assembly was filled with foreigners and 
slaves, but the account of the legal procedure appears to be accurate. The magistrates 
convened a meeting of the Assembly in the theater of Dionysus. The letter of the king was 
read out, which accused Phocion and his associates of treason, but granted the Athenians 
as free and independent the right to try their own citizens (Plut. Phoc. 34.2-3). Hagnonides 
then read a decree according to which the Assembly was to vote about the guilt of Phocion 
and the others by show of hands (Plut. Phoc. 34.4). Because this was an ad hoc procedure 
created by a decree, the method of voting had to be specified. Some asked for a clause to 
be added ordering the torture of Phocion before his execution, but Hagnonides refused 
(Plut. Phoc. 35.1). The reason of Hagnonides for rejecting this rider is interesting: he 
considers it awful and barbarous, but does not believe that the Assembly does not have the 
power to enact such a proposal about a trial. The proposal of Hagnonides was then put to 
the vote and approved (ἐπικυρωθέντος δὲ τοῦ ψηφίσματος), and the vote to condemn the 
defendants followed (τῆς χειροτονίας ἀποδοθείσης [ . . . ] κατεχειροτόνησαν αὐτῶν 
θάνατον) (Plut. Phoc. 35.2). It is important to note that the vote to enact the decree for the 
trial and the vote at the trial were formally separate: the decree created the procedure for 
the trial, and the vote about guilt was taken later. The condemned were then led to the 
prison and ordered to drink hemlock (Plut. Phoc. 36.1-4). After Phocion’s death, another 
decree was passed that his body be carried outside the boundaries of Attica and that no 
Athenian should light a fire at his funeral (Plut. Phoc. 37.2) . This was the standard penalty 
for traitors (Xen. Hell. 1.7.20-23), but once more the Assembly voted an ad hoc measure 
to impose a punishment on an individual. This incident is similar to the trial of the generals 
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in several ways and shows that the practice of arranging trials by decree continued into the 
late fourth century.  
 Demosthenes (19.276-81) reports another trial by decree, which is probably to be 
dated to 387/6. In his case against Aeschines, Demosthenes (19.276) recalls men 
condemned for their conduct on embassies and has a decree read out. By the terms of this 
decree, several men were sentenced to death (Dem. 19.277). One was Epicrates who had 
earlier helped to restore the democracy. Demosthenes (19.278) reads a clause from this 
decree: ‘Because they conducted their embassy contrary to their instructions (παρὰ τὰ 
γράμματα).’ Demosthenes then compares the conduct of these ambassadors with the 
conduct of Aeschines and his colleagues. Demosthenes (19.279) next quotes other clauses: 
‘And they were proved to have made false reports to the Council’ and ‘telling lies about 
the allies and receiving gifts.’ Finally Demosthenes (19.280) repeats that Epicrates was 
punished despite helping to restore the democracy. A fragment of Philochorus reveals that 
along with Epicrates, three others were condemned because they did not remain for their 
trial (FGrHist 328 F 149a).46 
 There are several other examples of trials in the Assembly, which may have also 
been instituted by a decree. In the same speech, Demosthenes (19.31, 137, 191) recalls that 
Timagoras was charged with taking bribes from the Great King, sentenced to death in the 
Assembly (31: Τιμαγόραν, οὗ θάνατον κατεχειροτόνησεν ὁ δῆμος) and executed (cf. Xen. 
Hell. 7.1.33-8).47 The trial must be dated around 367. Apollodorus ([Dem.] 49.9-24) reports 
that Timotheus was turned over to the Assembly for trial on a serious charge made by 
Callistratus and Iphicrates (9: ἐπὶ κρίσει δὲ παρεδέδοτο εἰς τὸν δῆμον αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης 
τυχών), but acquitted.48 His treasurer Antimachus was also tried in the Assembly and 
condemned to death with confiscation of his property ([Dem.] 49.10: κρίναντες ἐν τῷ δήμῳ 
ἀπεκτείνατε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ ἐδημεύσατε).49 Thrasybulus of Kollytus is also reported 
 
46  For discussion see Harding 2006: 165-77 though his date of 392 for the trial is questionable. Hansen  
1975: 87-8, followed uncritically by MacDowell 2000: 323 believes that this was a case of 
eisangelia, but the term is not found in Demosthenes’ account of the trials.  
47  Pace Hansen 1975: 92, followed uncritically by MacDowell 2000: 221, there is no reason to believe  
that this was a case of eisangelia, which did not cover cases involving the conduct of ambassadors 
while abroad.  
48  Pace Hansen 1975: 91 there is no reason to believe that this trial in the Assembly were cases of  
eisangelia. The term is not used by Apollodorus to describe the proceedings.  
49  Pace Hansen 1975: 91-2 there is no reason to believe that this trial was a case of eisangelia. Note  
that this term does not occur in sources for the trial.  
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to have been tried twice in the Assembly (Dem. 24.134: δὶς δεθέντα καὶ κριθέντα 
ἀμφοτέρας τὰς κρίσεις ἐν τῷ δήμῳ).50 The is also evidence for a trial and acquittal of 
Phedias in the Assembly reported by Plutarch (Per. 31.2-3), but it is difficult to evaluate 
the reliability of this information. The earliest attested trial in the Assembly is the 
accusation of Miltiades by Xanthippus reported by Herodotus (6.136.1: Ξάνθιππος ὁ 
Ἀρίφρονος ὃς θανάτου ὑπαγαγὼν ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον ἁπάτης εἵνεκεν Μιλτιάδεα ἐδίωκε), but 
there is no evidence about the procedure followed. This trial shows however that the 
Assembly retained the authority to try serious crimes from very early in the fifth century. 
All this evidence demonstrates that when Aeschines (3.4) refers to trials by decree, he must 
be referring to trials in the Assembly initiated by a decree, not trials in the courts whose 
procedures were modified by decrees as Carawan claims.51 
 
IV  
 The findings of this essay can be briefly summarized. The first finding is negative: 
there are strong grounds for rejecting Carawan’s hypothesis that the proposal of Ctesiphon 
to crown Demosthenes expired a year after it was made and had to be renewed in 330. The 
evidence also shows that when Demosthenes hopes that the court will impose atimia on 
Aeschines by not giving him one-fifth of the votes, he is referring to the standard legal 
penalty for frivolous prosecutions, not to a penalty created by a decree of the Assembly. 
The Assembly did not have the power to modify legal procedures in court by decree. 
Carawan’s account of the way the case of Ctesiphon came to court must therefore be 
completely rejected. 
 On the other hand, there have been several positive findings in this essay. First, this 
essay has shown that Euthycles presents a false interpretation of the law about decrees of 
the Council. This law had nothing to do with preliminary decrees, but applied only to 
decrees passed in the Council about the activities of the Council. The law was designed to 
limit the powers of the Council in comparison with the Assembly and sheds light on the 
 
50  Pace Hansen 1975: 89 there is no reason to believe that this trial was a case of eisangelia. Note that  
this term does not occur in sources for the trial.  
51  There is an example of the Assembly prescribing a procedure for a trial of Pericles on the Acropolis  
with the judges placing their balltos on the altar of Athena, but this was changed to a normal 
procedure (Plut. Per. 32.3-4). But Plutarch does not name a contemporary source for this proposal, 
which is without parallel in Athenian law and therefore suspect.  
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nature of decrees enacted by the Council. Second, this essay has clarified the nature of the 
atimia suffered by accusers in public cases who did not receive one-fifth of the votes. This 
atimia took away the right to bring any public cases in the future. Finally, it is now possible 
to understand what Aeschines (3.4) means by trials by decree: these are cases heard in the 
Assembly according to ad hoc procedures created by a decree. From the early fifth century 
down to the end of the fourth century, the Assembly had the authority to hold trials either 
by virtue the law of Cannonus or according to its own decrees. These trials had nothing to 
do with the legal procedure of eisangelia. The powers of the Assembly did not decrease in 
comparison with the powers of the courts after 400. Nor was there a gradual transition from 
popular sovereignty to the rule of law during the fourth century. Democracy and the rule 
of law went hand in hand in the fourth century as they had in the fifth century.52  
 
Appendix 
The scholion on Dem. 23.92 
ὡς ἄκυρον ἐστι τὸ ψήφισμα προβούλευμα γάρ ἐστιν] ἄλλη ἀντίθεσις ὡς ἀπὸ 
Ἀριστοκάτους. ἔστι δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥήτορος πεπλασμένη (ὥσπερ ἂν οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ὁμολογήσειεν 
ἀδικεῖν), ἵνα τῇ οἰκείᾳ γλώττῃ καταγνωσθῇ ὥσπερ ἡττημένος ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, ὁμολογῶν 
ἄκυρον εἶναι τὸ ψήφιμσα, πῶς ἀκυροῦν τὸ προβούλευμα σοφίζεται. οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἐπαινεῖ 
αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ᾽ ἂ μὲν ἠ βουλὴ ἐκύρου χωρὶς τοῦ δήμου, ἕως ἦρχεν, ἐπεκράτει καὶ ἦν ὄντως 
ἐπέτεια. τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου γιγνόμενα καὶ πλείονα μένει χρόνον, ἐπειδήπερ τὰ 
προβουλεύματα τῆς βουλῆς οὐκ εἰσήγετο εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν κύρια καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ 
δήμου, ἦν δὲ ἐπέτεια ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπ᾽ἐνιαυτόν, ὡς πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν δὲ ἔλαβεν ὅτι οὐκ ἦν 
κύριον καὶ μή πως εἰσαχθῇ εἰς τὸν δῆμον. τὸ δ᾽ὅτι οὐκ ἦν κύριον καὶ μή πως εἰσαχθῇ εἰς 
τὸν δῆμον. τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι ἐπέτεια ὡς πρὸς τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου, ἐψεύσατο. ἄκυρον μὲν γὰρ 
διὰ τὸ μήπω κυρῶσαι τὸν δῆμον, οὐ μὴν παραμένει γὰρ πολλάκις καὶ πολὺν χρόνον. 
 
Translation: Another objection from Aristocrates. This is invented by the speaker (just as 
no one would agree that he willingly did wrong) so that he is condemned by his own words 
 
52  See Harris 2016. I would like to thank Mirko Canevaro and Alberto Esu for reading over drafts of  
this essay and offering useful suggestions. The editors of the journal also sent me three reports by 
referees, which helped me to strengthen the arguments in this essay.  
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(i.e. tongue) as if defeated by the previous arguments agreeing that the decree is invalid he 
makes sophistic arguments about how to nullify the probouleuma. For he does not approve 
everything. But what the Council ratified without the people, as long as it was in office, 
was in effect, and was thus valid ‘for a year.’ The decrees enacted by the people remain in 
effect for a longer time when the preliminary motions of the Council were not introduced 
to the people, but were valid even without the (approval of the) people, but were for a year 
(instead of ep’eniauton), since he took it to the Council because it was not valid and was 
not introduced to the people. It was not valid because it had not yet been introduced to the 
people. He is misleading that the reason is ‘in effect for a year’ in regard to the decrees of 
the people. For it was not in effect because it was not yet ratified by the people, but not 
without effect completely on the grounds it was in effect for a year, but did not often remain 
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